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Providing Pensions for U.K. Employees with Varied 
Working Lives 
Deborah R. Cooper* 
Abstract 
Several different working lives are investigated, including employees with 
breaks in employment, part-time employment, and temporary employment. 
The pensions that could be provided to the different employees by final salary, 
revalued career average, or money purchase pension schemes (plans) are calcu-
lated and compared. Some of the weaknesses in a final salary pension scheme 
(the treatment of deferred pensioners and cross subsidies between different 
groups of member) are considered. Possible alternative benefit structures are 
considered to address the problems. 
Key words and phrases: pension scheme, defined benefit, final salary, revalued 
career average, money purchase 
1 Introduction 
Most occupational pension schemes l in the U.K. are defined ben-
efit final salary schemes (GAD, 1991). Such schemes aim to provide 
a penSion at retirement based on years of service completed with the 
sponsoring employer and salary received in the years immediately pre-
ceding retirement. Occupational pension schemes were introduced to 
meet the different needs of employers and employees: employers want 
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1 Pension schemes are called pension plans in the U.S. 
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a tax-efficient and paternalistic means of controlling their workforce, 
and employees want a secure pension in retirement that bears some re-
lation to the income they had received while working (Hannah, 1986). In 
the past employees were expected to stay with one employer through-
out most of their working lifetime. Consequently, pension schemes 
were designed with retirement in mind, often giving no entitlement to 
benefit on early withdrawal. 
1.1 Early Withdrawal Benefits 
The benefits occupational pension schemes provide for early with-
drawals have improved considerably since pension schemes were intro-
duced. In the private sector the change has arisen largely as a result 
of legislation. In the U.K. early withdrawals (with more than two years' 
qualifying service2) now can expect a deferred pension increasing be-
tween the time of withdrawal and retirement at 5 percent per annum or 
the rate of increase in the retail prices index over this period, whichever 
is less. The value of the early withdrawal benefit, however, is still likely 
to be less than the reserve that would normally be held for an equivalent 
member remaining in the scheme. The difference between the value of 
the withdrawal and staying benefits can reduce job mobility. 
Because individuals who leave money purchase pension schemes 
receive the full value of the reserve held (ignoring any surrender penal-
ties), money purchase pension schemes are considered to be more port-
able. The withdrawal benefit now provided by final salary pension 
schemes is a substantial improvement over what was available 20 years 
ago;3 it is also better than what is available in many other countries 
with occupational pension schemes (FEE, 1995). Final salary pension 
schemes therefore have made a significant effort to rectify a major 
weakness in their retirement benefit provisions; at the same time they 
often have improved the level of other benefits that they offer. 
1.2 Final Salary Pension Schemes 
Many pension schemes are designed with the view of providing a 
target benefit which usually is expressed in terms of an indiVidual's 
annual salary immediately before retirement, i.e., final salary. Final 
salary pension schemes frequently are criticized for the benefits they 
2Qualifying service is service that contributes toward the pension that will be paid 
from the scheme, which may include deferred benefits. 
3Prior to 1978 members of occupational pension schemes had no statutory right to 
a withdrawal benefit. 
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provide to certain types of employees, in particular for the cross sub-
sidies that exist between various categories of members. (For example, 
see Disney, 1995.) Despite their apparent faults, however, they make an 
increasingly important contribution to the income of pensioners (John-
son and Stears, 1995). It is necessary to understand the Significance of 
the problems in their design and to discover whether it is possible to 
amend them. 
For those persons who do not have a substantial period of contin-
uous service with one employer up to retirement, final salary pension 
schemes may not provide the best option. For these persons money 
purchase provision may offer better value for money. Value for money, 
however, is a difficult concept to judge. For example, money purchase 
pension schemes may offer employees a better rate of investment re-
turn than a defined benefit pension scheme (Disney, 1995), but they 
also carry the possibility of a worse return. 
In a defined benefit pension scheme the investment risk largely is 
carried by the sponsoring employer. In a money purchase pension 
scheme, however, the plan participant takes the risk. This makes money 
purchase pension schemes more or less attractive according to the indi-
vidual concerned's attitude toward risk. Similarly, there may be greater 
flexibility within a money purchase pension scheme. For example, an 
individual member of a money purchase pension scheme normally will 
be able to choose which benefits the scheme should provide and to se-
lect a retirement age. Taking advantage of the fleXibility, however, is 
likely to make the pension scheme more expensive. 
1.3 Objectives 
Because of the changing nature of employment [with much new em-
ployment being of the temporary or part-time variety (CSO, 1996)], it is 
important to consider the impact of changing workplace dynamics on 
the accumulation of pension benefits. This paper examines the pension 
benefits provided by different types of U.K. pension schemes to persons 
with different working lives and compares them with the benefits pro-
vided by a final salary pension scheme. Several categories of working 
lifetimes are defined,4 and the retirement benefits accrued in the dif-
ferent pension schemes by each category are calculated and compared 
under various scenarios. Though the arguments put forward in this 
paper are based in the situation in the U.K., the problem of providing 
4 Appendix 1 defines terms which may not transcend international boundaries. 
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pensions for employees with different working histories is not unique 
to the U.K., and the paper's conclusions can be applied more generally. 
Final salary pension schemes are not risk free for all members. For 
early withdrawals there is the risk that they may be unable to achieve 
an adequate final salary pension because of the incomplete portability 
offered by final salary pension schemes compared to money purchase 
pension schemes. The paper attempts to quantify this risk. 
A profound concern in performing this type of comparison is that 
less than 50 percent of the workforce in the U.K. has occupational pen-
sion schemes available to them (GAD, 1991). The past 15 years in the 
U.K. (and in many other industrialized countries) have seen a shift in 
the nature of employment from permanent full-time jobs to part-time 
and temporary work (CSO, 1992; Polivka, 1996). In the European Union 
there are approximately 14 million part-time and 10 million temporary 
workers. Table 1 shows the position of the U.K. 
Those with part-time or temporary jobs are least likely to have access 
to occupational pension schemes, even when such pension schemes are 
provided by their employers (GAD, 1991; Hipple and Stewart, 1996). 
Even when they are available, final salary pension schemes are con-
sidered to provide poor value for money. Those companies that offer 
pension schemes to their full-time employees but exclude part-time or 
temporary employees frequently use this argument, together with con-
cerns about administrative costs, to justify exclusion. 
Table 1 
Temporary and Part-Time Workers. 
In Great Britain (Excluding Northern Ireland) 
As a Percentage of All Employees 
Temporary Work Part-Time Work 
Males 4.0% 
Females 7.8% 
Total 6.0% 
6.0% 
8.0% 
6.9% 
4.3% 
80.1% 
26.3% 
Source: Social Trends, Volrunes 17, 25, and 27. 
7.8% 
85.7% 
32.9% 
State pension schemes have been ignored throughout the paper for 
the sake of SimpliCity. 
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2 Varied Working Lives 
2.1 Definitions of Varied Working Lives 
Defined benefit pension schemes have developed assuming that the 
average employee will have a long period of full-time employment with 
one employer until retirement. This type of employee is becoming less 
common in today's workforce. Other patterns of employment are in-
creasingly likely to be the norm. 
We will consider examples of different working lifetimes and will 
look at the benefits possible under different pension arrangements. 
These examples will encompass persons employed part time; persons 
who are made redundant and who mayor may not return to work; per-
sons who take time from paid employment to look after children or 
other dependents; persons who change jobs frequently; and persons 
who change the hours they work. The six basic categories of working 
lifetimes have been taken from Davies and Ward's pamphlet for the 
Equal Opportunities Commission (Davies and Ward, 1992). They are: 
• No Breaks (that is, in paid full-time employment throughout the 
working life); 
• Break and Part-Time (that is, having time away from full-time paid 
employment and then returning to part-time employment); 
• Break and Full-Time (that is, having time away from full-time paid 
employment and then returning to full-time employment); 
• Break and Mixed (that is, having time away from full-time paid 
employment and, having returned to employment, experiencing a 
mixture of part-time and full-time employment) ; 
• Late Break (that is, taking a break from full-time employment rel-
atively late in life) ; 
• Late Start (that is, starting paid employment later than assumed 
for the other classes of employee) 
These categories were designed primarily to consider the working 
patterns of women who took time away from paid employment to care 
for children (for example, break and part-time) or elderly relatives (for 
example, late break). With little adaptation they can be used to consider 
the working lifetimes of employees (both male and female) who have 
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been made redundant and not been able to find replacement employ-
ment or who have only been able to find short-term or temporary em-
ployment. To make the calculations more comprehensive and to deal 
with these alternatives, some extra histories have been considered. The 
considerations result in a total of eleven categories. For example, vari-
ations of late break are conSidered, where the break is either short or 
long. Finally, a cyclical working pattern has been included to portray 
the experience of many semi-skilled and low-skilled workers whose op-
portunities for employment tend to vary according to the economic 
cycle. 
Additional calculations have been performed for employees who 
change jobs regularly throughout their working lifetimes, but are al-
ways assumed to be in employment. The labor markets in the U.K. and 
the U.S. appear to be characterized by high turnover at young ages and 
increasing tenure as employees age. Some figures are given in Tables 
2 and 3. In the U.K. the average tenure has not changed significantly 
over the past ten years (CSO, 1997); in the U.S. there is some debate 
about whether average job tenures are falling (Farber, 1995; Swinner-
ton and Wial, 1995). It is estimated that the probability of an employee 
in the U.S. remaining in paid employment for longer that four years is 
approximately 50 percent (Swinnerton and Wial, 1995). 
Table 2 
Average Job Tenure in the U.K. 
1986 1996 
Males 9.4 years 
Females 6.5 years 
Table 3 
8.9 years 
7.1 years 
Median Job Tenure in U.S. 
Age 1993 
25-34 3.2 years 
35-44 5.8 years 
45-54 9.5 years 
55-64 12.4 years 
Periods of job security increase with age, which is to the relative 
advantage of a final salary scheme because the value of these schemes 
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is weighted toward employment close to retirement age. In contrast, the 
value of money purchase schemes is weighted toward employment at 
younger ages. Full details of the assumptions made about the different 
categories of employment are given in Appendix 2. 
2.2 Measuring Benefits for Different Categories of Employ-
ment 
A difficulty in dealing with diverse groups of persons is finding a 
standard of comparison for the benefits provided by the different pen-
sion schemes that is appropriate for all concerned. There are several 
possible choices of benchmark, each one with certain advantages and 
disadvantages. Two used in this paper are described below. 
2.2.1 Total Service Pension 
One measure to use as a benchmark is the pension that could be 
provided from a final salary pension scheme, had all of the employee's 
service been completed in consecutive years, in a pension scheme that 
does not distinguish part-time and full-time service. This is called the 
total service penSion. 
The total service pension is, arguably, the best pension a final salary 
pension scheme can be expected to provide: it ignores breaks in service 
as well as changes in type of employment. It does not compensate part-
time employees and those taking breaks from employment for the lower 
rates of salary growth assumed (see Section 4.3.3) and the shorter time 
spent in paid employment; as expected, these employees do not have a 
direct opportunity to recoup the earnings they have lost. 
2.2.2 Final Salary 
For final salary pension schemes, there is a choice of which final 
salary to use.s If we choose the final basic salary of the individual 
concerned, it becomes difficult to make comparisons across the board. 
There is also an additional problem: for some groups final salary may 
have been earned several years prior to retirement, while for others it 
may not be an annual rate. On the other hand, if a comparison is made 
sCommon definitions of final salary in the U.K. include basic salary earned in the 12 
months preceding retirement; the average annual rate of basic salary earned in the 36 
months preceding retirement; and the annual rate of salary at retirement, including the 
average of 'fluctuating emoluments' over the preceding 36 months (GAD, 1991) 
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with the employee's last earnings before retirement, we can get some 
idea how well different pension schemes provide replacement income 
for its members. 
The results under final salary are influenced heavily by the total 
amount of service; that is, the longer the employee has worked, the 
better the pension scheme appears. With few exceptions the "full-time 
and bonus" category of employee appears to do best using final salary 
as a measure of performance, and the "break and mixed" category em-
ployees appear to do worst. 
Other measures that do not depend on a particular working his-
tory demonstrate the force of two commonplace observations: first, the 
longer the period over which the employee contributes to a money pur-
chase pension scheme, the larger the expected benefit; second, making 
provision in money purchase pension schemes early in the employee's 
working lifetime is important. These observations both provide argu-
ments in favor of a state pension, such as the basic state penSion in the 
U.K., which underpinS other layers of benefit.6 
3 The Different Pension Schemes 
The different pension schemes considered are deliberately simple. 
For occupational pension schemes to succeed they must be attractive 
to both employers and employees. A penSion scheme with a relatively 
simple benefit design will be straightforward to manage and easy to 
understand and so will be desired by both groups. 
3.1 Final Salary Pension Scheme 
The final salary penSion scheme used provides a pension of 1/60th 
of final salary for each year of service completed. This is the most com-
mon accrual rate among contracted oue pension schemes in the U.K. 
private sector (GAD, 1991); public sector schemes, which provide an ac-
crual rate of 1/80th, provide a lump sum in addition to the pension. For 
those employees working part time, the pension scheme provides a pen-
sion based on the annual rate of salary, with total service aggregated. 
Someone retiring with a total of n years of service, with an average of 
hi (hi:::; 40) hours per week during year i (i = 1,2, ... , n), where 40 
6 A comparison with the basic state pension is given in Appendix 3. 
7That is, contracted out of the state earnings related pension scheme (Appendix 1). 
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hours is considered full time, would receive an annual pension of: 
S n h· 
Annual Pension = 60 I _t 
i=140 
13 
where S is the annualized rate of salary received in the 12 months pre-
ceding retirement. Thus, someone retiring with a total of 30 years at 
20 hours per week part time would receive an annual pension of: 
. S 20 S Annual PenSIOn = - x 30 x - = -60 40 4· 
Those pension scheme members who work different part-time hours at 
different points in their career will have the appropriate proportion of 
each year of service used in the calculation. 
A further consideration is how members of pension schemes are 
treated when they move from one category of employment to another. 
For example, if an employee moves from full-time to part-time status, 
some penSion schemes make the full-time entitlement paid-up8 and 
start accrual in the pension scheme afresh as a part-time employee. 
This may be the case if a separate pension scheme is operated for part-
time employees. Other pension schemes may consider the two peri-
ods continuous service. Where relevant, results are presented on both 
bases. 
Finally, we consider the position of pension schemes that allow em-
ployees to take extended breaks and return to service, counting the 
periods of employment at either side of the break as one consecutive 
period for accrual purposes. Several pension schemes, particularly in 
the public sector, allow past members who rejoin the pension scheme 
after a break from employment to have service counted as continuous 
on payment of a small contribution, usually related to pay at previous 
withdrawal. In effect, this is the total service penSion. 
3.2 Revalued Career Average Pension Scheme 
The revalued career average pension scheme provides a pension of 
1/60th of the revalued career average salary for each year of service. 
Calculations have been made assuming a rate of revaluation in line with 
price inflation as well as one in line with growth in earnings. The former 
rate of revaluation will make the pension scheme perform less well 
8That is, the accrued pension is frozen, receiving only statutory revaluation rather 
than increasing in line with salaries. 
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than a final salary pension scheme for a full-time employee. Also, if 
revaluation is in line with increases in salaries, then, the final salary 
pension scheme and the revalued career average pension schemes are 
identical for full-time employees. 
In this revalued career average pension scheme there is no difficulty 
with the treatment of early withdrawals, because the same rate of reval-
uation is applied to deferred benefits. The different categories of mem-
bers do not have to be considered separately. The state earnings-related 
pension scheme operates in this way. 
The pension for part-time employees is calculated Similarly to the 
final salary pension scheme. 
3.3 Money Purchase Pension Scheme 
Two money purchase pension schemes are included in the analysis: 
• Employees contribute 5 percent of their salaries throughout their 
working lifetimes . 
• When employees are in full-time paid employment they contribute 
the maximum amount to the pension scheme, which, for simplic-
ity, is assumed to be 17.5 percent of salary at all ages. For part-
time employees, however, they contribute only 5 percent of salary 
at all ages. 
The first arrangement was selected because, on average, the contribu-
tion to occupational pension schemes made by members is about 5 
percent of their salaries (GAD, 1991). Few employers have chosen to 
make contributions to the private money purchase pension schemes 
(or personal pension plans) of their employees. Consequently, it seems 
reasonable to calculate the amount of pension that could be provided 
with the contributions saved by opting out of an occupational pension 
scheme. For simplicity the calculations do not allow explicitly for ex-
penses. Implicit allowances are made instead. 
There are several reasons for the two tiers of contribution in the 
second plan. First, those with low pay have less opportunity to save, so 
it seems unreasonable to suppose those employees would continue to 
invest the same proportion of their salaries in a penSion scheme if they 
moved from full-time to part-time employment (Table 4). Second, if an 
employer were to contribute to a money purchase pension scheme, it 
seems most likely that they would do so only for full-time employees.9 
9That a low level of contribution will lead to a low level of benefit is not a failure of 
money purchase schemes. The problems of money purchase schemes that this paper 
considers are those of volatility and high cost. 
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Finally, most individual money purchase pension schemes have a fixed 
charge deducted from each contribution, so the value to the plan par-
ticipant of the contribution made reduces with the amount. Thus, the 
lower tier acts partly as an implicit allowance for per policy fees. 
Table 4 
Distribution of U.K. Annual Household Expenditure 
On Personal Pensions by Gross Income 
Quintiles 
5th 4th 3rd 2nd 
Lowest Bound £117 £223 £367 
Avg Wkly Exp £0.25 £0.84 £2.68 £4.54 
1st (Top) 
£556 
£14.92 
Source: Family Spending, (50,1995; Avg Wkly Exp = Average Weekly Expenditure. 
In addition we consider what level of contribution would be required 
by a money purchase scheme (given the assumptions made) in order to 
reproduce the retirement benefit provided by the final salary scheme. 
4 Assumptions 
The calculations have been performed for an employee starting em-
ployment on £16,000. This is close to the average wage for male em-
ployees in 1995. In most cases the absolute figure does not matter, as 
the comparison is done using proportions and percentages. In addi-
tion, it is assumed that the basic state pension will continue to increase 
in line with the Retail Prices Index, as it has since 1979. Other assump-
tions are specified below. 
4.1 Service 
The calculations assume a full working lifetime consists of 40 hours 
paid employment per week from age 20 to 60; the maximum pension in 
the final salary pension scheme is 2/3rds of salary. Pension payments 
to retirees start at the normal pensionable age, which is age 60. It could 
be argued that 65 is a more realistic retirement age because most pen-
sion schemes have a normal pension age of 65 for men, and the trend 
seems to be to equalize pension ages for men and women at age 65 
(GAD, 1991). The average age at which pension payments commence, 
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as reported in the Government Actuary's Survey, is about age 61, how-
ever. Employees often take early retirement, whether voluntarily or not. 
An older normal retirement age would enhance the apparent per-
formance of money purchase pension schemes because of the effect of 
compound interest and mortality. The calculations assume that em-
ployees start contributing to money purchase pension schemes at age 
20, however, and the early commencement age partially offsets the ef-
fect of the early retirement age, so this apparent unfairness has largely 
been ignored. 
Part-time employees have been included at two levels of service. 
Over 5 million persons work part time in the U.K., of whom about 80 
percent are women. Significant proportions of male part-time employ-
ees are those already in retirement from their main occupation (GAD, 
1991), and it is difficult to make allowance for this group. Until women 
have children, those in employment are largely in full-time work (Mar-
tin and Roberts, 1984). Of these, 50 percent return to work within 
nine months of having a baby; about 30 percent return to full-time em-
ployment (McRae and Daniel, 1991). Many of the remainder return to 
part-time work once their children are in school. We can assume that, 
to some extent, women choose to work part-time because of child care 
responsibilities. 
Part-time employees are assumed to work for either 40 percent (that 
is, 16 hours) or 75 percent (that is, 30 hours) of a full working week. In 
addition, the service histories of some part-time employees used in the 
analysis assume that women are able to choose to work longer hours 
as their children grow older. There is some evidence to support this 
pattern (EOCNI, 1993). For example, the "break-and-mixed" category 
assumes the employee starts by working full-time; stops paid employ-
ment to care for young children; returns to paid part-time employment 
of 16 hours per week; has a further break; and then works until retire-
ment at 30 hours per week. 
4.2 Mortality 
Except in the calculation of the annuity used for converting the 
money purchase fund into a penSion, mortality is ignored throughout 
the analysis. This has different implications for the defined benefit pen-
sion schemes and for the money purchase pension scheme, although 
the effect on death benefits is the same. By ignoring mortality the anal-
ysis assumes that the death benefits provided are equal in value to the 
reserve or actuarial liability. 
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4.2.1 Money Purchase Pension Scheme 
By ignoring mortality when accumulating the contributions paid to 
the money purchase pension scheme the analysis assumes that, on 
death before retirement, the value of the fund is applied to purchase 
benefits for any dependent survivor or is paid to the estate of the plan 
participant. 
We assume that the full accumulated fund is used to purchase re-
tirement pension. Death benefits in addition to those provided by the 
accumulated fund must be purchased with additional contributions. In 
general this means that unless an additional contribution is paid, the 
provision for dependents on early death will be inadequate. 
4.2.2 Defined Benefit Pension Schemes 
The average defined benefit pension scheme provides a lump sum 
death benefit of nearly three times pensionable salary together with a 
spouse's pension calculated allowing for some enhancement of service 
(GAD, 1991). In the private sector this is usually up to full potential 
service. Except for older employees, the value of these benefits is likely 
to be greater than the reserve required to fund the retirement benefit. 
Ignoring mortality can result in an underestimate of the cost of a 
money purchase pension scheme and of the value of the benefits from 
a defined benefit pension scheme. Rather than adjust the calculations 
to allow for this difference between the two types of pension scheme, 
we will discuss it in the results section. 
The other decrements affecting pension schemes are withdrawal and 
ill health retirement. These are considered in later sections of this pa-
per. 
4.3 Economic Assumptions 
Interest rate assumptions are needed to project the accumulated 
value of the money purchase fund; as a yardstick to measure salary 
growth and inflation; and to cost the annuity at retirement. These rates 
are difficult to predict, and the results are sensitive to the assumptions 
chosen. For this reason, a sensitivity analysis is included as part of 
the results. The interest rates are assumed to be constant over time 
as the comparison of results is made only at the end of one period of 
time. The rates reflect an average of the experience over the period of a 
person's working lifetime. Each assumption is briefly discussed below. 
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4.3.1 Inflation 
The inflation assumption is used to increase benefits while in defer-
ment and as a basis from which to estimate real rates of salary growth 
and real interest rates. 
It is assumed that the Retail Prices Index will increase 4 percent per 
annum. This is slightly higher than the current U.K. government's self-
imposed maximum inflation target, but lower than the average over the 
past 20 years. 
If inflation is higher than that assumed in the projection, then nom-
inal investment return will improve if the real rate of investment re-
turn remains the same. Similarly, if real rates of salary growth remain 
the same, salaries paid will be higher. Thus, money purchase pension 
schemes will perform relatively better than otherwise, having higher 
income from investments and contributions; defined benefit pension 
schemes will award pensions based on a higher salary figure. The ben-
efit design of the pension schemes will determine which arrangement 
gives the better value for money. 
4.3.2 Real Interest Rates 
The assumption for real interest rates is combined with the infla-
tion assumption to accumulate the contributions made to the money 
purchase fund. A real rate of return of 4 percent per annum has been 
assumed. This rate reflects what is currently available on longer term 
index-linked gilts lO (roughly 3.5 percent on gilts maturing in 2030, as 
of March 1996) which gives a conservative estimate of the likely invest-
ment performance of a fund (Thornton and Wilson, 1992). This ap-
proach can be justified for two reasons: first, the rate used is assumed 
to be net of expenses (to allow implicitly for expenses), and second, 
most persons included in the categories of employees in this survey 
will be on fairly low and insecure incomes and probably would want a 
personal pension plan giving a reasonably secure investment return. 
In the U.K. it seems that a small majority of investors in personal 
pension plans prefer more cautious, with profit, poliCies to unit-linked 
policies (ABI, 1996). Some figures are given in Table 5. Some of the 
linked poliCies are linked to with-profit or fixed interest unitized funds. 
Low interest rates penalize the money purchase pension scheme 
both by depressing the assumed performance of the pension scheme 
and by making the annuity more expensive. In order to explore a plau-
10 Gilts is the name given to securities issued by the United Kingdom government. 
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Table 5 
Personal Pensions: New Business 
(In £1,OOO,OOOs) 
1991 1993 1995 
Number of New Policies 2595 2030 1199 
Net Premium Income: 
Single Premium-Linked 1719 2393 1675 
Single Premium-Non-Linked 2254 2626 1628 
Yearly Premium-Linked 600 580 536 
Yearly Premium-Non-Linked 519 517 411 
DSS* Rebate-Linked 369 207 92 
DSS* Rebate-Non-Linked 226 139 53 
Total 5688 6462 4395 
* The DSS rebate is the contribution paid by the Department of Social 
Security to appropriate personal pension schemes (Appendix 1). 
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sible range of results, calculations also have been performed assuming 
real interest rates of 5 percent. 
4.3.3 Real Salary Growth 
The assumption for real salary growth also can be considered to be 
low: a real rate of salary growth of 1 percent per annum has been as-
sumed. While average salaries increased faster than this over the 1980s, 
there is no certainty that they will continue to do so. At present, only 
senior executive salaries are increasing faster than the rate of inflation, 
and these employees are unlikely to have part-time contracts. Calcula-
tions also are performed assuming 2 percent real growth. This is to be 
consistent with the 5 percent real growth tested above, as a 4 percent 
gap between real interest rates and real salary growth may be too large. 
The analysis assumes that salaries only increase faster than inflation 
when an employee is in full-time work. At ages when a working pro-
file imposes part-time work, salaries are increased in line with inflation 
only. Similarly, after a period of unemployment, the salary at which the 
employee is assumed to reenter employment will be the salary at the 
previous date of exit increased in line with inflation only. There is evi-
dence to support these assumptions, as well as the belief that part-time 
employees are usually paid less than the equivalent full-time employ-
ees. This can be shown by comparing hourly rates and by considering 
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measures of productivity (Kremer and Montgomery, 1993). No attempt 
has been made to allow for different relative levels of pay in the analy-
sis. 
A consequence of the assumption that real salary growth only occurs 
during periods of full-time employment is that those taking breaks from 
employment will return to work at a relatively lower level of pay than 
their contemporaries who remained in full-time work. 
lust as assuming large real investment returns will result in a better 
performance for money purchase pension schemes, larger real salary 
growth will mean defined benefit pension schemes pay a larger pen-
sion. In the case of high real investment returns, however, the appar-
ent advantage accrues only to the money purchase pension scheme. In 
the case of high salary growth, there is an advantage to both types 
of pension schemes: the money purchase pension scheme benefits 
from larger contributions. In practice, if investment returns are better 
than expected over the long term, members of defined benefit pension 
schemes can expect to receive some advantage. In the past, surplus in 
occupational pension schemes has been used to make (discretionary) 
increases to pensions in payment and, less frequently, other benefit 
improvements. 
4.3.4 The Annuity 
An interest rate consistent with the inflation and real interest rate 
assumptions above has been used to calculate the annuity. 
The comparison between the money purchase and defined benefit 
pension schemes has been made assuming that a pension increasing 
at 4 percent per annum is purchased (that is, in line with limited price 
increases, given the inflation assumption). According to the Govern-
ment Actuary's survey (GAD, 1991), occupational pension schemes in 
the private sector guarantee, on average, increases of about 2 percent 
per annum. In 1986 they granted increases of 3.5 percent per annum, 
on average. Public sector penSion schemes guarantee increases in line 
with inflation. Although limited price increases are only a statutory re-
quirement on pensions accrued after April 1997, it seems reasonable 
to include the cost of increases to make the comparisons consistent. 
Allowing for increases to pensions in payment will make money pur-
chase pension schemes appear to perform less well than defined pen-
sion schemes. 
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5 The Results 
We begin by considering how well final salary pension schemes per-
form compared to the total service pension, and by presenting the es-
timated additional cost required to fund the difference between the 
final salary pension and the total service pension for each category of 
member. The benefits provided by a revalued career average pension 
scheme also are considered. The pensions provided by money purchase 
pension schemes are compared with the total service pension, and the 
vulnerability of the plan participant to worse than expected investment 
and salary experience is investigated. 
A comparison of benefits with the basic state pension and with av-
erage earnings is presented in Appendix 3 to reinforce some of the 
results. 
5.1 Final Salary Defined Benefit Pension Scheme 
Final salary pension schemes are considered to fall short of mem-
bers' expectations on two counts: (i) because of their treatment of early 
withdrawals, and (ii) because of cross subsidies between members. We 
shall first consider early withdrawals. 
5.1.1 Deferred Pensioner 
The benefit paid to early withdrawals usually has a smaller value 
than the reserve required for employees who remain with an employer. 
Deferred benefits normally are increased at rates less than the rate of 
increase in earnings. The results presented in Table 6 show, however, 
that (given the set of assumptions used for the calculations) the differ-
ences are not exceptional. The calculation of the total service pension 
effectively assumes that all service is completed contiguously and in 
the years immediately preceding retirement. This is used as a proxy 
for a final salary pension scheme that increases deferred pensions in 
line with earnings. Table A4 in Appendix 2 gives the amount of the 
total service pension accrued by each category of employee relative to 
the full-time pension. 
We can assess how poorly deferred employees do under the present 
arrangements by comparing the total service pension with the pension 
calculated assuming movements between part-time and full-time ser-
vice do not interrupt pension accrual (called "part/full time continu-
ous"). The difference in the two pensions arises because of the differ-
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ence between inflation and salary growth. We have calculations assum-
ing a 1 percent and 2 percent real salary growth. 
Table 6 
Pension Allowing for Periods of Deferment 
As a Percentage of Total Service Pension 
Real Salary Growth 
1% Growth 2% Growth 
Full-Time 100.0% 100.0% 
Break and Mixed 97.3% 94.7% 
Late Break 92.5% 86.0% 
Break and Part-Time 99.6% 99.2% 
Early Break and Full-Time 96.3% 93.5% 
Late Break and Full-Time 94.0% 89.1% 
Short Break and Full-Time 93.7% 88.8% 
Long Break and Full-Time 94.4% 89.7% 
Late Start 94.0% 89.1% 
Full-Time & Bonus 100.0% 100.0% 
Cyclical 93.0% 86.7% 
As expected, deferred pensioners do less well when the annual real 
salary growth rate is large. In addition, they would do less well under 
current legislation if inflation were high over the deferred period, as 
the statutory increase in deferment is capped at 5 percent per annum. 
Categories (other than the "full-time" and "full-time & bonus" cate-
gories) that appear to do relatively well under the present arrangements 
are those with the smallest proportion of full-time employment. Their 
earnings do not attract real salary increases; therefore, the difference 
between deferred benefits and ongoing benefits does not significantly 
reduce their expectations. 
Table 7 gives the additional contributions (paid over a working life-
time) required as a percentage of annual salary to make up the shortfall 
in pension identified in Table 6. 
We also can consider the position of employees who are in full-time 
paid employment throughout their career, but who change jobs fre-
quently. Some employees choose to change jobs frequently, but em-
ployees increasingly are being offered temporary contracts-these em-
ployees have no choice about their job mobility. Between 1994 and 
1995 the number of employees with temporary contracts increased 10 
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Table 7 
Additional Contribution Required 
To Fund the Total Service Pension 
*4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Full-Time 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Break and Mixed 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 
Late Break 0.6% 0.4% 1.2% 0.9% 
Break and Part-Time 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
Early Break and Full-Time 0.4% 0.3% 0.8% 0.6% 
Late Break and Full-Time 0.6% 0.4% 1.2% 0.9% 
Short Break and Full-Time 0.6% 0.4% 1.3% 1.0% 
Long Break and Full-Time 0.5% 0.4% 1.0% 0.8% 
Late Start 0.6% 0.5% 1.3% 1.0% 
Full-Time & Bonus 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Cyclical 0.5% 0.4% 1.1% 0.8% 
*4/1, for example, refers to 4 percent real investment growth and 
1 percent real salary growth. 
percent to 1.5 million. The majority of persons in these jobs would have 
chosen permanent employment had it been available (CSO, 1996). With 
each withdrawal, the contribution to pension made by a period of ser-
vice is effectively downgraded in a typical final salary pension scheme. 
The results for employees who change jobs frequently are presented 
in Table 8, and the extra contribution required to meet the shortfall is 
shown in Table 9. 
Table 8 
Pension Allowing for Periods of Deferment 
As a Percentage of Total Service Pension 
Withdraw Every Five Years 
Withdraw Every Ten Years 
Withdraw After Five Years Only 
Real Salary Growth 
1% Growth 
84.6% 
86.7% 
96.3% 
2% Growth 
72.5% 
76.1% 
93.8% 
Tables 8 and 9 show that those employees who change paid employ-
ment frequently are disadvantaged in a final salary pension scheme if 
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Table 9 
Additional Contribution Required 
To Fund the Total Service Pension 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Withdraw Every Five Years 
Withdraw Every Ten Years 
Withdraw After Five Years Only 
1.5% 1.1% 
1.3% 0.9% 
0.3% 0.3% 
3.2% 
2.8% 
0.7% 
2.4% 
2.1% 
0.6% 
deferred pensions are increased in line with inflation only. The impact 
of real salary increases has a more significant effect than the frequency 
of job change, however, as shown in Table 10. 
In certain circumstances, it is possible to redress the balance be-
tween early withdrawals and those who remain with an employer. For 
an employer, the motivation to do so could depend on the reason for 
leaving employment. Employees leave their jobs for several reasons, 
e.g.: 
• They choose to go to another employer; 
• They are made redundant or their contract ends; 
• They need time away from employment, for example, for child 
care and would like longer than their statutory allowance. 
Those employers who give employees the right to an extended break 
without jeopardizing their future employment may have addressed the 
grounds for complaint of one of the above groups. For example, the em-
ployee will be able to count the two periods of service as though they 
were continuous for the calculation of benefit and frequently will be 
allowed, for a nominal contribution, to have the break included as part 
of their pensionable service. Employees seem to support this arrange-
ment, even when they are unlikely to profit directly from it (Gough, 
1997). 
Similarly, those employees who are made redundant are already en-
titled to lump sum payments, as established in employment law. Part of 
the redundancy payment could be directed toward a pension scheme. 
In addition, if it can be agreed that at least part of the employer's con-
tribution to an occupational pension scheme is in respect of deferred 
pay, the redundancy payment could be increased to allow for this, and 
that part of the lump sum could be compulsorily invested in a pension 
arrangement. 
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Table 10 
Portion of Total Service Pensions Earned By 
An Employee Who Regularly Changes Employment 
Real Salary Length of Consecutive Employments (in Years) 
Growth 1 2 5 10 20 
1% 
2% 
82.9% 83.0% 84.6% 86.7% 
69.8% 70.4% 72.5% 76.1% 
91.0% 
83.6% 
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The level of replacement income provided by the different pension 
schemes for some categories of employee is shown in Table 11. The re-
sults suggest that if an employee in a final salary pension scheme must 
take a break from paid employment, it should be taken early rather than 
late. The deferred pension will then be in respect of a shorter period 
of service. This differs from the position of an employee in a money 
purchase pension scheme, where it is better to take a late break. With 
the assumption of 1 percent real salary growth, the employee taking 
an early break loses about 2 percent of the value of the total service 
pension, and the employee taking a late break loses 3 percent. If there 
is 2 percent real salary growth, the loss is in the order of 3 percent and 
6 percent, respectively. The length of the break in employment also 
affects the level of replacement income available from a final salary 
pension scheme, although not substantially. The total service pension 
is the same percentage of final salary, regardless of the assumption for 
salary growth. 
Table 11 
Pensions as a Percentage of Final Salary 
With Deferred Pension 
Total Service 1% Real 2% Real 
Pensions Salary Growth Salary Growth 
Early Break 50.0% 48.2% 46.7% 
Late Break 50.0% 47.0% 44.5% 
Short Break 58.3% 54.7% 51.8% 
Long Break 41.7% 39.4% 37.4% 
Now we turn to the other cross subsidies. Cross subsidies exist 
in any insurance arrangement, such as a defined benefit retirement 
pension scheme. An obvious subsidy is from those who die just be-
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fore reaching retirement to those who survive well beyond pension age. 
Other subsidies include: 
• From employees with no dependents to those with dependents; 
• From those who do not have much salary growth, particularly to-
ward the end of their career, to those whose salary grows faster 
than the average, particularly close to retirement (Wilkie, 1985). 
The former problem is discussed in Section 6. The latter issue can 
be considered by looking at the results for the "full-time-and-bonus" 
employee. 
This paper does not attempt to address the issue of cross subsidies. 
We just consider the extent of their presence in the different schemes 
under consideration. 
5.1.2 Salary Growth 
If we consider "full-time-and-bonus" employees, we can investigate 
the different benefits available to employees whose salary falls when 
approaching retirement. It is assumed that this category of employee 
receives a 20 percent bonus on salary up to age 45 due, for example, 
to overtime payments. Thereafter, the bonus stops and the employee 
receives basic salary only. Consequently, the employee's pension will 
be calculated using the same final salary as other full-time employees, 
including those who have no history of overtime. The calculation of 
the final salary pension ignores the bonus earned when the employee 
was younger. Because of this problem with the formula, many final 
salary pension schemes ignore so-called fluctuating emoluments (com-
pensation) in the calculation of pensionable salaryll (GAD, 1991). The 
employee is able to make other pension provisions, such as additional 
voluntary contributions. If defined benefit pensions are intended to 
maintain the level of income just before retirement, this arrangement 
seems reasonable. A sizable proportion of pension schemes include 
all pay in the calculation of pensionable salary, however, so it is worth 
considering the alternatives. The results for the "full-time-and-bonus" 
category are given in Table 12. 
The relative values of the benefits depend heavily on the rate of 
revaluation assumed to be applied in the revalued career average pen-
sion scheme. Even though the employee was assumed to earn 120 per-
cent of the basic salary for 25 years, revaluation in line with inflation is 
llThe salary included in the calculation of pension. 
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Table 12 
Revalued Career Average Pension Received by Full-Time 
And Bonus Employees as a Proportion of Final Salary 
Revalued in Line With: 
1% Real Salary Growth 
2% Real Salary Growth 
Inflation 
61.8% 
51.4% 
Note: Total Service Pension is 66.7% of final salary. 
Salaries 
75.0% 
75.0% 
27 
unable to match the benefit from the final salary pension scheme. The 
position is improved, however, when the pension scheme revalues pen-
sionable salaries in line with salary growth. The employee effectively 
earns 12.5 percent more pay over a working lifetime than an employee 
who receives no bonus, and this is reflected in the pension. 
Thus, employees with fluctuating emoluments that decrease in size 
toward retirement may receive a higher pension from a revalued career 
average pension scheme. It follows that a final salary pension scheme 
that includes such employees, and incorporates their total pay in the 
definition of pensionable salary, will incorporate some cross subsidy 
from these employees to those without fluctuating emoluments. Using 
similar arguments, it also follows that there is a cross subsidy from 
those with lower salary growth than the average to those with higher 
salary growth. 
We shall now consider the revalued career average pensions of the 
other categories of employee. 
5.2 Revalued Career Average Pension Schemes 
The employees who do relatively well in a revalued career average 
pension scheme, even when the revaluation is only in line with price 
inflation, are those who work part time. Because it is assumed that the 
salaries of part-time employees do not increase any faster than price 
inflation, this should not be surprising. Even so, the pension scheme is 
unable to provide a pension as large as the final salary pension scheme. 
If the rate of revaluation is increased to be in line with salary growth, the 
position alters. All categories of employee do at least as well (full-time) 
or better (all other categories) in the revalued career average pension 
scheme as they would do in a final salary pension scheme. These results 
28 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 5, No.1, 1997 
are shown in Table 13, assuming 1 percent real salary growth, and they 
should be compared with those in Table 6. 
The revalued career average pension, with revaluation in line with 
earnings, restores the link to actual years worked that is partly lost in 
the final salary scheme for those employees with breaks in their working 
history. As a result, we see that a revalued career average pension 
scheme can be used to remove the cross subsidy between stayers and 
withdrawals, as well as between low and high earners. The pension 
design depends not only on service, but also on how significant a year 
of service is in terms of income to the employee. 
Table 13 
Revalued Career Average Pension 
As Percentage of Total Service Pension 
Revalued in Line With: 
Inflation Salaries 
Full-Time 82.9% 100.0% 
Break and Mixed 94.1% 118.2% 
Late Break 89.0% 111.6% 
Break and Part-Time 97.9% 119.9% 
Early Break and Full-Time 86.9% 101.7% 
Late Break and Full-Time 86.9% 103.5% 
Short Break and Full-Time 84.9% 101.5% 
Long Break and Full-Time 89.0% 106.4% 
Late Start 86.9% 101.7% 
Full-Time & Bonus 92.5% 112.5% 
Cyclical 91.3% 113.4% 
There are difficulties in adopting a sensible and fair level of revalua-
tion. The data in Table 12 show the relative penalties to one category of 
employee where revaluation is in line with inflation and salaries grow 
faster than inflation. In addition, if a pension is viewed as deferred 
compensation, then its value should reflect real levels of salaries when 
it vests, otherwise part of the salary in each year of work prior to retire-
ment has been devalued. Because a single, average rate of revaluation 
must be applied to all members in a pension scheme, those employees 
whose salaries increase faster than the average may feel that they are 
subsidizing those with flatter salary progression. If the annual rate of 
revaluation is appropriate for the industry in which the company oper-
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ates or even linked to actual rates of salary growth within the company, 
the effect of the revaluation will be to maintain the real value of a year 
of work. The extent of the cross subsidy will be reduced significantly. 
5.3 Money Purchase Pension Schemes 
The calculations show that, if the pension purchased under a money 
purchase scheme is compared with the total service penSion, those 
employees who have breaks in their employment appear to do better 
than the standard "full-time" employee from money purchase pension 
schemes (Table 14). For example, assuming a contribution of 5 per-
cent salary to a money purchase pension scheme and 5 percent real 
investment growth and 2 percent real salary growth, the "break-and-
part-time" employee receives 89.4 percent of the total service pension, 
whereas the "full-time" employee receives a pension of only 56.3 per-
cent. The employees' career profiles assume they all begin their paid 
employment with a period of full-time service, and the effect of these 
early contributions is most significant: "break-and-part-time" employ-
ees do best because the largest proportion of their contribution is made 
in the early years. 
When replacement income is conSidered, the position is reversed; 
full-time employees appear to do better. This apparent contradiction 
arises because the total service pension is based on the proportion of 
time worked, whereas the comparison for replacement income is based 
on final annualized salary. That is, it will be relatively larger than the 
total service pension for those whose paid employment included part-
time work. 
The contributions required throughout a working lifetime, as a con-
stant proportion of salary, to reproduce the total service pension in 
retirement (given the assumptions of the paper) are presented in Table 
14. The pension being funded by each category of employee is the same 
amount in the columns 4/1 and 5/1 and a higher amount in columns 4/2 
and 5/2. The different assumptions for real salary growth do not have 
a significant effect on the contribution required from those employees 
with part-time service, as they only experience real salary growth for 
a small proportion of their careers. There is a notable difference for 
those employees working full time. 
We can use Table 14 to form an idea of how vulnerable money pur-
chase pension schemes are to changes in experience. For example, if a 
full-time employee chose to contribute 8.9 percent of salary to a pen-
sion scheme (assuming 5 percent real interest and 2 percent real salary 
growth) and the experience of the pension scheme turned out to aver-
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Table 14 
Contributions to a Money Purchase Pension Scheme 
Required to Fund a Total Service Pension 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Full-Time 9.4% 7.0% 11.7% 8.9% 
Break and Mixed 7.0% 5.1% 7.6% 5.5% 
Late Break 7.6% 5.5% 8.7% 6.4% 
Break and Part-Time 7.4% 5.4% 7.6% 5.6% 
Early Break and Full-Time 10.0% 7.6% 11.8% 9.1% 
Late Break and Full-Time 9.2% 6.9% 11.0% 8.3% 
Short Break and Full-Time 7.4% 7.1% 11.5% 8.7% 
Long Break and Full-Time 8.7% 6.4% 10.1% 7.5% 
Late Start 10.1% 7.8% 12.0% 9.3% 
Full-Time & Bonus 8.2% 6.1% 10.3% 7.7% 
Cyclical 7.6% 5.6% 8.5% 6.2% 
age 4 percent real interest and 1 percent real salary growth, the retire-
ment pension provided by the pension scheme would be 5.5 percent 
less than expected. The "break-and-part-time" employee contributing 
5.6 percent would be 24.3 percent lower. These calculations are sum-
marized in Table 15. 
The data in Table 15 give an indication of the downside risk of using 
money purchase arrangement to provide for retirement income. In the 
U.K. for money purchase pension schemes operated by an employer, 
there is an obligation for an actuary to recommend a level of contribu-
tion for a given target benefit. For individual money purchase pension 
schemes (personal pension plans) a salesperson normally would pro-
vide estimates of the projected level of benefit, given certain levels of 
contribution. The bases that can be used for the projection are pre-
scribed. Currently the mid-range basis would permit 9 percent interest 
and 3 percent inflation, which is not too dissimilar from the 5/2 as-
sumption (it is more optimistic). 
If the money purchase pension scheme earns interest at 8 percent 
per annum rather than 9 percent, then its value, accumulated to retire-
ment, will be less than estimated at the start. Similarly, if the employee 
experiences real salary growth of 1 percent per annum rather than 2 
percent, then the fund will receive less income from contributions and 
will be smaller than originally estimated. Thus, the penSion it provides 
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will be smaller. In addition, if interest rates at retirement are lower than 
anticipated, the cost of the retirement annuity will be more expensive, 
reducing the pension even further. In a money purchase scheme all 
these risks are borne by the individual plan participant. 
Table 15 
Effect of Wrong Contribution Level 
Full-Time 
Break and Mixed 
Late Break 
Break and Part-Time 
Early Break and Full-Time 
Late Break and Full-Time 
Short Break and Full-Time 
Long Break and Full-Time 
Late Start 
Full-Time & Bonus 
Cyclical 
Percentage of 
Total Service Pension * 
94.5% 
77.5% 
84.0% 
75.8% 
91.5% 
89.7% 
92.5% 
86.1% 
92.1% 
94.6% 
82.0% 
* Assumes that the contribution required to fund the total service pension, given 
5 percent real interest and 2 percent real salary growth is paid and that actual 
experience is 4 percent real interest and 1 percent real salary growth. 
Those persons we are assuming are least able to accept the uncer-
tainty of a money purchase pension scheme (for example, those with 
some part-time employment) are the most vulnerable. 
From Table 14 it should be apparent that if employees contribute 
the maximum 17.5 percent of salary assumed under the money pur-
chase and variable arrangement, in all cases the pension provided will 
exceed the total service pension. The comparison for employees with 
full-time paid employment only is straightforward. Those employees 
with periods of part-time employment contribute at different rates de-
pending on their status, making the comparison more difficult. Be-
cause the two categories concerned both begin paid work in full-time 
employment, the importance of their early contributions together with 
their depressed final salary (due to inflation only increases) makes the 
money purchase pension scheme perform slightly better than the con-
tributions paid would suggest. 
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5.4 Case Study 
We have seen that the employees who appear to do least well in 
a final salary pension scheme are those who change jobs frequently. 
The employee who changes jobs regularly, but is always in full-time 
employment, and the cyclical category of employee both receive pen-
sions of less than 85 percent of their respective total service pensions 
from the final salary scheme. Consequently, we consider the pension 
entitlements of these employees in more detail. 
Assume an employee wishes to receive a pension equal to the total 
service pension. This is equivalent to the revalued career average pen-
sion the employee would receive, if revaluation were in line with salary 
growth. Because the revalued career average pension scheme meets the 
aim, we only need consider money purchase and final salary pension 
schemes. 
There are various possibilities for the employee. For example, the 
employee could: 
• Join an occupational pension scheme and pay additional voluntary 
contributions; 
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the equiv-
alent of the members' contribution to the pension scheme; 
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the contri-
bution believed necessary to fund 100 percent of the total service 
pension; or 
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the equiv-
alent of the members' contribution to the pension scheme, with 
the employer contributing the remainder. 
Table 16 shows the contributions required by these employees to 
fund a total service pension. If the employee joins a final salary pen-
sion scheme, then additional voluntary contributions are necessary to 
increase the scheme's pension to the total service pension. These are 
given in the first row of figures for each category. Otherwise the em-
ployee must join a money purchase pension scheme and fund the total 
service pension himself or herself, perhaps in conjunction with an em-
ployer. The contribution required for this is given in the second row of 
figures. 
We should consider the employee's financial position while in em-
ployment, depending on the decision made. Assume members con-
tribute 5 percent of their pay to the occupational pension scheme. Then 
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Table 16 
Contribution to Money Purchase Pension Scheme 
Or Additional Contributions Required for Equivalent Pension 
Change Jobs 4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Every 5 Years 
Final Salary Scheme 1.5% 1.1% 3.2% 2.4% 
Money Purchase Scheme 9.4% 7.0% 11.7% 8.9% 
Cyclical 
Final Salary Scheme 0.5% 0.4% 1.1% 0.8% 
Money Purchase Scheme 7.6% 5.6% 8.5% 6.2% 
Source: Tables 9 and 14. 
the employee's gross pay will be reduced the amounts shown in Table 
17. Categories 1), 2), 3) and 4) in the Table refer to the four options 
discussed above, respectively. 
Table 17 
Contribution Required From Employee 
Under Each Arrangement 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
5 years 1) 6.5% 6.1% 8.2% 7.4% 
2) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
3) 9.4% 7.0% 11.7% 8.9% 
4) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
Cyclical 1) 5.5% 5.4% 6.1% 5.8% 
2) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
3) 7.6% 5.6% 8.5% 6.2% 
4) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
The financial position of the employee in retirement will be the same, 
except for the second option where the employee will fare less well. 
For example, if the money purchase fund experienced 5 percent real 
growth and the employees receive 1 percent real salary growth, the 
fund of the employee moving jobs every five years would be able to 
purchase a pension of 71.4 percent of the total service pension; the 
cyclical employee's fund would be 89.3 percent of that necessary for 
the total service pension. 
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We need only consider the first, third, and fourth options. The third 
option is the most expensive. The best alternative financially seems to 
be the fourth option, where the employer contributes to the employee's 
personal pension plan, because (assuming the assumptions are borne 
out by experience) the employee receives the target pension and pays 
the least contribution. The fourth option ignores the cost of other ben-
efits provided by a defined benefit pension scheme (for example, the 
cost of life insurance and the ill health pension). If these costs are in-
cluded, the choice between the first and fourth options becomes more 
difficult. In particular, as the benefit in the first option is provided 
by a final salary pension scheme, the risk of the pension being lower 
than expected because of poor investment performance is limited. With 
the fourth option the risk of underperformance rests solely on the em-
ployee. 
A revalued career average pension scheme would meet the target 
benefit of both these categories of employee, provided revaluation was 
in line with salary growth. If such a scheme is not available, then the 
best chOice for both categories appears to be between: 
• Joining a money purchase pension scheme where a reasonable 
level of contributions are made by the employer and hoping that 
the benefit of good investment performance will compensate for 
the additional expenditure on insured benefits that might be nec-
essary; and 
• joining a defined benefit pension scheme final salary with the 
certainty of a pension (and other benefits) which can be supple-
mented by additional contributions to compensate for revaluation 
of deferred benefits at less than the rate of growth of salaries. 
Few employers contribute to individual money purchase pension 
schemes, and when employers have introduced occupational money 
purchase schemes they have tended to pay lower contributions than 
they would pay to a final salary pension scheme (NAPF, 1996). In prac-
tice, those employees with access to an occupational scheme are likely 
to be in the second position; those without access to an occupational 
scheme will have to choose the third option above, assuming they can 
afford it. Again, the evidence shows that persons choosing to start in-
dividual money purchase pension schemes frequently pay a minimum 
level of contribution and that there is a large proportion of the working 
population with no pension provision other than that provided by the 
state. 
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6 Death in Service and Other Issues 
6.1 Death in Service and Other Insurance Benefits 
The results of Section 5 have ignored the provision for death and 
other benefits provided by defined benefit pension schemes. This seems 
a reasonable approach because, for some categories of employee, a 
death benefit may not be important and may represent further cross 
subsidy (from single members to those with dependents). Security for 
dependents is important for a large percentage of the population, how-
ever, and should not be ignored. 
The average death in service benefit provided by a defined benefit 
pension scheme is a lump sum of approximately three times the an-
nual salary at the time of death, together with a spouse's pension of 25 
percent pensionable salary. This is unlikely to require a contribution 
to a money purchase scheme much in excess of 1 percent of salary.12 
The cost of the ill health (disability) pension is harder to estimate, but 
could be as much as 4 percent of salary.13 These benefits could cost 
more than the difference between the costs of the money purchase and 
final salary pension schemes identified above. An obvious problem is 
that those employees for whom such insurance is relatively expensive 
are more likely to choose to join an occupational pension scheme, as-
suming one is available. This could increase the overall cost of defined 
benefit pension schemes. 
The cost of both these forms of insurance will increase with the 
age at which contributions begin and also may increase throughout 
the policy term. Money purchase pension schemes are likely to be rel-
atively more attractive to younger employees, even ignoring the cost 
of insurance, and this could be a problem for defined benefit pension 
schemes. Employees could choose to opt out of occupational pension 
schemes while young, expecting to be able to join their employers pen-
sion scheme when older. In the long run this could prove to be a poor 
strategy because it will increase the average age of the membership of 
occupational pension schemes, thereby increasing their average cost. 
Because the provision of occupational pension schemes is voluntary, 
employers may choose to close the pension schemes as the cost in-
creases, leaving no pension scheme for aging employees to join. If 
employers were able to make membership of pension schemes com-
12This figure was calculated assuming a term assurance for the lump sum necessary 
to fund the benefit, allowing for the accumulated value of the money purchase fund. 
13This amount was reached after some telephone inquiries to insurance companies. 
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pulsory, as was possible in the past, this problem at least could be 
avoided.14 
6.2 Administration 
Most employers effectively meet the cost of administering occupa-
tional defined benefit pension schemes. Sometimes they only do so 
implicitly, as they usually meet the balance of the cost of the pension 
scheme. In any case, it is important that administration costs are kept 
to a minimum. 
One problem is in data storage-in final salary pension schemes this 
is frequently used as a reason for excluding part-time and temporary 
employees because it can be difficult to record the number of hours 
worked each week. Data handling software packages are making such 
advances that this should become less of a problem. The only infor-
mation that needs to be stored for a revalued career average pension 
scheme, regardless of category of employee, is the total revalued salary 
to date. This can be uprated annually, for example when tax statements 
are produced. Consequently, any additional data handling can be kept 
to a minimum for all employees. 
In individual money purchase schemes the plan participant will have 
to meet the expenses of the provider. In an occupational money pur-
chase scheme it is usual for the employer to meet the expenses. Because 
of economies of scale, the expense margins are usually lower for group 
schemes. 
7 Summary and Conclusion 
While the assumptions and methodology underlying the calculations 
can be criticized for their simplicity, they still serve to demonstrate 
some useful results. 
For many working histories, a defined benefit occupational pension 
scheme can offer good value for money. Revalued career average pen-
sion schemes, where revaluation is in line with earnings, meet many of 
the criticisms of final salary pension schemes. 
14Legislation was introduced in the U.K. prohibiting companies from making mem-
bership of an occupational pension scheme a condition of employment because of their 
perceived problems with portability. If the portability problems were addressed, there 
should be less objection to compulsory membership. 
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Final salary pension schemes compare poorly with money purchase 
pension schemes in some circumstances. Their two main weaknesses 
are: 
• When salaries grow significantly faster than inflation and deferred 
benefits are increased in line with inflation only; 
• When interest rates are significantly higher than the rate of salary 
growth and than assumed in the funding basis and the extra re-
turns are not passed to the members of a defined benefit pension 
scheme. 
The former condition primarily affects employees who change jobs. In 
some cases employees change employment because they perceive an 
advantage to a new job. The employer, who meets the balance of cost in 
most defined benefit pension schemes, may have trained the employee 
and perceive a significant finanCial disadvantage to the move. Most 
employers feel justified in providing a deferred benefit that gives less 
weight to the years worked with the employer than a retirement benefit 
would give. 
Persons increasingly are leaving employment because they have been 
employed on a temporary contract or because they have been made re-
dundant. In these situations there may be no financial compensation 
to the employee (other than a redundancy payment to those entitled 
under employment law), but presumably there is a perceived benefit 
to the employer. To penalize these employees further by reducing the 
amount of the pension they can expect to receive at retirement is less 
justifiable. 
The results show that in certain circumstances the extra cost re-
quired to revalue deferred benefits in line with earnings is not great. For 
an employee changing jobs every five years the cost calculated varies 
between 1.1 percent and 3.2 percent of salary per annum. If employ-
ers do not want to increase the overall cost of an occupational pension 
scheme, an alternative is to review the target benefit provided at retire-
ment. 
This brings us to another cross subsidy: between employees experi-
encing different rates of salary growth. By comparing the benefits pro-
vided by a revalued career average pension scheme and a final salary 
pension scheme we see that in a final salary penSion scheme those 
employees with flatter salary progression effectively subsidize those 
with faster salary progression. The problem is one of equity: each em-
ployee's pension year should be identified and given a fair weighting in 
the calculation of the eventual benefit paid which leads to a revalued ca-
reer average design where the rate of revaluation is linked to increases 
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in earnings. With this design the problem of deferred benefits would 
disappear. 
The second circumstance in which money purchase pension schemes 
outperform defined benefit pension schemes is also a question of eq-
uity. To whom does the surplus in a penSion scheme belong if the em-
ployer meets the balance of the cost? If the contribution is perceived 
solely as deferred pay, then the surplus belongs to the members of the 
pension scheme. As the employer's contribution can fluctuate without 
any regard to the progression of employees' earnings and, in any case, 
it is calculated in a way that is not intended to be member specific, it 
may be unreasonable to assume 100 percent of the contribution is in 
respect of deferred pay. If this is the case, some mechanism for shar-
ing the surplus between the employer and the members of the pension 
scheme could be devised. This could depend on the extent to which 
the employer has a commitment to meet payments where the pension 
scheme is in deficit and on the normal cost of the penSion scheme as 
reported in the Companies Act accounts. 
If some categories of employees are to be paid higher benefits in de-
fined benefit pension schemes without the overall cost increasing, other 
employees will have to receive lower benefits. A final salary pension 
scheme could achieve this by reducing the target benefit in a pension 
scheme by redUCing the rate of accrual, while introdUCing revaluation 
for deferred benefits in line with salary growth. This leaves the problem 
of cross subsidy between different rates of salary growth. A revalued 
career average pension scheme can address both problems by remov-
ing the proportionately larger rewards available in final salary pension 
schemes to those whose salaries increase faster than the average. While 
probably not removing all of the cross subsidy (because some index of 
average salary growth will have to be adopted by the pension scheme), 
the problem is at least controlled. It is also demonstrably equitable and 
consistent with the idea of pensions representing deferred pay. 
Personal pension plans will always have something to offer employ-
ees. For example, they can be much more flexible than occupational 
pension schemes. In particular, the majority of persons in paid em-
ployment do not have access to occupational pension schemes. Money 
purchase pension schemes cannot offer insurance to the same degree as 
a defined benefit pension scheme. The results of this paper reinforce 
the work of others (for example, Davies and Ward, 1992) in demon-
strating the difficulties of relying on money purchase arrangements, 
particularly for the less well paid. It is possible to develop a reasonably 
straightforward pension scheme that can offer a fair level of benefit to 
many different categories of employee. 
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Appendix l-Glossary of Terms 
Additional Voluntary Contributions-In the U.K., members of occupa-
tional pension schemes are allowed to make additional voluntary 
contributions, up to certain limits of their salaries, in order to in-
crease their benefits in retirement. The contributions attract the 
same tax relief as ordinary contributions to a pension scheme. 
Appropriate Personal PenSion Plan-If an individual chooses to con-
tract out of the state earnings-related scheme through a personal 
pension plan, the U.K. Department of Social Security pays part of 
the individual's national insurance contributions to an appropri-
ate personal pension plan. This is known as the contracted out 
rebate. The contributions must be accounted for separately from 
the plan participant's other contributions. More than half of the 
persons who have personal pension plans only have an appropri-
ate personal pension plan; that is, they do not make any additional 
contribution beyond the rebate made by the Department of Social 
Security (Williams and Field, 1993). 
Basic State Pension-In the U.K. (and most other developed countries) 
the government pays a pension to those persons over the state 
retirement age who satisfy certain eligibility requirements. In 
the U.K. eligibility depends on the number of national insurance 
contributions paid. Within European Union countries the level of 
this pension varies between approximately 15 percent of average 
salary and 25 percent of average salary. 
Limited Price Increases-In the U.K. the 1994 Pensions Act prescribes 
that for pensions accrued after April 1, 1997, defined benefit pen-
sion schemes must increase the pension in payment by limited 
price increases. That is, pensions in payment must be increased 
by the minimum of 5 percent or the rate of increase in the Retail 
Prices Index over a year. 
Linked and Nonlinked Policies-The value of contributions paid to 
linked poliCies will change according to an associated investment 
fund. Depending on the fund chosen, the contributions will be 
more or less secure. The value of nonlinked poliCies can only in-
crease and will do so at the rate of bonus declared by the insurance 
company. 
National Insurance Contributions-In the U.K. the national insurance 
contributions are a tax levied on employees and employers for so-
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cial insurance benefits provided by the state. Employees only pay 
the tax (which is scaled according to the amount earned) on pay 
under the upper earnings limit. The insurance cover includes, for 
example, unemployment benefits and maternity benefits, as well 
as the basic state pension and the state earnings-related penSion. 
Occupational Pension Scheme-A pension scheme providing pensions 
in respect to a period of employment with an employer partici-
pating in the pension scheme. The participating employer must 
make regular contributions to the scheme. Employees of partici-
pating employers can join the pension scheme, provided they sat-
isfy its eligibility rules. Many occupational pension schemes only 
cover certain categories of staff; frequently temporary employees 
or those working part time are excluded (GAD, 1991). Member-
ship cannot be compulsory. Whether employees who choose to 
join the pension scheme make contributions depends only on the 
scheme rules. The pension scheme can be defined benefit or de-
fined contribution. 
State Earnings-Related Pension-Some governments provide pensions 
in excess of the basic level described above. This pension is usu-
ally salary related, although it is common for the definition of pen-
sionable salary used in the calculation to be capped. In the U.K. 
the pension is called the state earnings-related pension scheme 
(SERPS), and it is based on an individual's upper band earnings 
[the salary between the lower earnings limit (approximately equal 
to the basic state pension) and the upper earnings limit (approxi-
mately seven times the lower earnings limit)]. SERPS is effectively 
a revalued career average scheme, with an earnings cap. 
Appendix 2-Career Patterns 
Using the information provided in studies such as those by Martin 
and Roberts (1984) and Dex (1984), and after discussion with the Equal 
Opportunities COmmission, Davies and Ward (1992) use the career pat-
terns given below: 
1) No Breaks-Employed full-time throughout working life. 
2) Break and Part-Time-Employed full-time until a relatively few years 
are taken from paid employment for child care followed by part-
time employment until retirement. 
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3) Break and Full-Time-Employed full-time until a longer break from 
paid employment is taken for child care followed by full-time em-
ployment. 
4) Break and Mixed-Employed full-time until relatively few years are 
taken from paid employment for child care followed by a mixture 
of unemployment, part-time and full-time employment, finishing 
with a gap in the employment record. 
5) Late Break-Only two periods away from full-time paid employment, 
the first for child care, the second over the period up to age 60 
for other types of family care. There is also a period of unemploy-
ment. 
6) Late Start-A gap in paid employment until the mid-20s, followed 
by full-time paid employment except for a short break for child 
care. 
(Davies and Ward, 1992) 
The categories used in this paper are given in Table Al which summa-
rizes the paid work in different five year periods. Thus, for example, 
a "break-and-mixed" category employee is assumed to be working part 
time in paid employment for 75 percent of the week between the ages 
45 and 49. The full-time-and-bonus category is assumed to work over-
time until age 45 and then to continue basic full-time work 
Table A2 presents the time spent in paid employment by each cat-
egory as a percentage of the maximum assumed possible of 40 years 
and the total service pension accrued as a percentage of that accrued 
by a full-time employee. 
If the salary of each category of employee were assumed to grow 
at the same rate regardless of whether the employee was in full-time 
or part-time work or employed or unemployed, then the ratios of total 
service pension to full-time pension would be the same as the ratios of 
service. The differences occur because it is assumed that salaries grow 
at different rates, depending on employment status. Table A2 indicates 
the retirement income lost, relative to the full-time income, due to the 
different working profiles. 
Table Al 
Assumed Working Histories of Different Categories of Employee 
Age Range 
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 
Full-Time 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Break and Mixed 1 1 0 0.4 0 0.75 1 0 
Late Break 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Break and Part-Time 1 1 0 0.4 0.4 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Early Break and Full-Time 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Late Break and Full-Time 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Short Break and Full-Time 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Long Break and Full-Time 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Late Start 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Full-Time & Bonus 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 1 1 
Cyclical 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
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Table A2 
Comparing Time in Paid Employment 
And Total Service Pension 
Total Service Pension: 
Real Salary Growth of: 
Service 1% 2% 
Full-Time 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Break and Mixed 51.9% 40.5% 31.6% 
Late Break 62.5% 53.8% 46.4% 
Break and Part-Time 63.1% 47.3% 35.5% 
Early Break and Full-Time 75.0% 67.9% 61.5% 
Late Break and Full-Time 75.0% 67.9% 61.5% 
Short Break and Full-Time 87.5% 83.3% 79.3% 
Long Break and Full-Time 62.5% 53.8% 46.4% 
Late Start 75.0% 67.9% 61.5% 
Full-Time & Bonus 112.5% 100.0% 100.0% 
Cyclical 50.0% 41.0% 33.6% 
45 
Appendix 3-Results for Basic Pension and Average 
Salaries 
Most persons who have enrolled in personal pension schemes have 
paid only the minimum contribution (that is, the contracted out rebate). 
For someone earning an average wage in the 1995/96 tax year, this 
amounted to just less than 5 percent of upper band earnings.1 5 Table 
A3 shows that in many cases this level of contribution would provide a 
pension not much greater than the basic state pension. 
Table A3 also illustrates a potential problem that may arise due to 
the British government's current policy of uprating the basic state pen-
sion in line with prices rather than earnings. In the discussion on money 
purchase pension schemes, Table 14 demonstrates that the least ben-
eficial experience for a money purchase pension scheme (of the bases 
considered) was 4 percent real investment return and 2 percent real 
lSUpper band earnings are those earnings between the lower earnings limit (£358 per 
week in 1995/6) and the upper earnings limit (£440 per week in 1995/6). The state 
earnings-related pension is based on upper band earnings. 
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Table A3 
Pension Provided by a Contribution of 5 Percent Salary, 
Expressed as a Proportion of the Basic State Pension 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Full-Time 184.1% 245.9% 216.6% 286.0% 
Break and Mixed 99.2% 138.0% 105.8% 146.6% 
Late Break 122.3% 168.3% 134.9% 184.4% 
Break and Part-Time 110.9% 151.7% 118.3% 161.5% 
Early Break and Full-Time 117.6% 153.6% 132.1% 170.9% 
Late Break and Full-Time 127.3% 170.3% 142.5% 188.9% 
Short Break and Full-Time 152.7% 203.4% 175.2% 230.7% 
Long Break and Full-Time 106.8% 144.8% 116.8% 157.1% 
Late Start 115.9% 149.7% 130.6% 167.4% 
Full-Time & Bonus 211.5% 284.3% 247.1% 328.5% 
Cyclical 93.0% 127.6% 100.3% 136.8% 
salary growth. Here it appears that 4/1 is the worst. Similarly it ap-
pears 5/2 gives a lower pension than 5/1. This happens because the 
basic state pension has been assumed to increase in line with prices 
only. That is, the increase in salaries enters the equation on the asset 
side (as increased contributions) only and not the liability side (where 
it can represent increased standard of living). 
We can present the pensions in Table A3 as a proportion of average 
full-time earnings at retirement. The results are given in Table A4. 
While the pension provided under the 4/2 assumption is a smaller 
proportion of average salary than the pension provided under the 4/1 
assumption, it is a larger amount. The assumption of 2 percent real 
salary growth means that more contributions are paid to the scheme, 
but not to such an extent that the pension can compensate for the larger 
growth in average earnings. 
The basic state penSion is currently about 15 percent of average 
earnings. If real rates of salary increase 1 percent per annum, in 40 
years the basic state pension would be only 10 percent of average earn-
ings; if real salaries increase 2 percent, it would be 7 percent. Now 
we can see the small amount of pension that some employees who con-
tribute only the minimum amount to a money purchase penSion scheme 
can expect to receive at retirement. 
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Table A4 
Pension Provided by a Contribution of 5 Percent Salary, 
Expressed as a Proportion of Average Earnings 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Full-Time 35.5% 47.4% 28.4% 37.5% 
Break and Mixed 19.1% 26.6% 13.9% 19.2% 
Late Break 23.6% 32.4% 17.7% 24.2% 
Break and Part-Time 21.4% 29.2% 15.5% 21.2% 
Early Break and Full-Time 22.7% 29.6% 17.3% 22.4% 
Late Break and Full-Time 24.5% 32.8% 18.7% 24.8% 
Short Break and Full-Time 29.4% 39.2% 23.0% 30.3% 
Long Break and Full-Time 20.6% 27.9% 15.3% 20.6% 
Late Start 22.3% 28.9% 17.1% 22.0% 
Full-Time & Bonus 40.8% 54.8% 32.4% 43.1% 
Cyclical 17.9% 24.6% 13.2% 18.0% 
By gradually devaluing the basic state pension, the British govern-
ment will find an increasing number of pensioners either accepting in-
creasing levels of poverty or claiming income support.16 
16Income support in the U.K. is a means tested social security benefit paid to those 
on low income. 
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